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Discretion as blame avoidance: Passing the buck to local 
DXWKRULWLHVLQµZHOIDUHUHIRUP¶ 
Jed Meers 
Introduction 
The delegation of discretion to local authorities is a useful tool for Governments and 
legislatures wrestling with the vast complexity of social security schema. Done well, local 
discretionary decisions ± as opposed to tightly prescribed statutory schemes ± can individualise 
service provision, correct for deficiencies in rules-based reasoning, and help to manage the 
µFDVHE\FDVH¶FRPSOH[LWLHV WKDWDULVHZKHQ WKH%\]DQWLQHVRFLDO VHFXULW\ V\VWHPPHHWV Whe 
reality of day-to-day lives (Molander, 2016, 10-12). Debates have therefore focused on 
discretion as an implementation issue ± such as in the vast literature on street-level bureaucracy 
in welfare administration (Hupe et al, 2013, 11-23) ± or on the balance between rights and 
discretion in the welfare state ± FDWDO\VHG E\ 7LWPXVV¶ HDUO\ ZRUN  DQG 'ZRUNLQ¶V
LQIDPRXVPHWDSKRURIGLVFUHWLRQDVWKHµhole in the doughnut¶ (Sainsbury, 2008, 327-328). 
This paper argues that conferring discretion to local authorities can serve as a means to an end 
unconcerned with effective social security provision: avoiding blame for the impacts of 
Government social security policy. By delegating discretion down to local authorities, 
executing D µFXW DQG GHYROYH¶ DSSURDFK the UK Government has avoided delineating the 
boundaries of those impacted by key elements of LWVµZHOIDUHUHIRUP¶DJHQGD (namely, benefit 
cuts) in legislation and passed responsibility for the impact of reductions downwards to local 
government in the grip of a funding crisis. Conflicts at the heart of flagship policies stemming 
from the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 can 
FRQVHTXHQWO\EHµGHOLEHUDWHO\IXGJHG¶ (Prosser, 1981, 150). 
The argument is put in three sections. The first reflects on the evergreen nature of debates on 
the role of discretion and outlines three established rationales for central governments to confer 
discretion to local authorities in the context of social security provision, arguing that there is 
an additional fourth rationale: blame avoidance. The second examines this rationale in more 
detail, outlining four key functions of µbuck-passing¶ in social security reform. Finally, the 
paper turns to some specific examples in England to illustrate the arguments made throughout: 
the Council Tax Reduction Scheme (CTRS), Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs), and 
Local Welfare Assistance schemes. 
1. What is the rationale for conferring discretion in social security provision? 
Discretion is an evergreen problem in social security. A layer of discretionary provision 
floating over a more legally secure ± though for many insufficient ± minimum core has long 
been of varying scale and importance in the British welfare state. $µGXDODSSURDFK¶SURYLGLQJ
weekly supplements or lump-sum payments alongside base-level core provision, has persisted 
in one form or another from the Unemployment Assistance Scheme in 1934 until the abolition 
of the Social Fund in 2013 (Walker, 2015, 45-48). Concerns about the conferral and exercise 
of discretion are equally as longstanding. The pages of the early editions of the Journal of 
Social Welfare Law read as a veritable ³ZKR¶V who´ of social security academia raising 
concerns over the balance of discretion within the social security system. /LVWHU¶VEOLVWHULQJ
critique of the µLQFUHDVLQJ LPEDODQFH¶ /LVWHU   EHWZHHQ WKH EDVH-scale and 
discretionary additions in the Supplementary Benefits Scheme LVIROORZHGE\%XOO¶VZDUQLQJ
on the µKHDY\UHOLDQFHRQGLVFUHWLRQDU\H[WUDV¶%XOO DQG/RYHODQG¶VFULWLFLVPRIWKH
µVORZ HUURU-SURQH DQG LQFRQVLVWHQW¶ EOHQG RI µUXOHV  DQG GLVFUHWLRQDU\ SRZHUV¶ in the 
provision of housing benefit (Loveland, 1987, 216). The series of chapters focused on 
GLVFUHWLRQXQGHUWKH6XSSOHPHQWDU\%HQHILWV6FKHPHLQ$GOHUDQG%UDGOH\¶VHGLWHGFROOHFWLRQ
in particular Wilding¶V (1976, 55) and Hodge¶V (1976, 65), are testament to the rich lineage of 
µUHOHQWOHVVO\ GHEDW>LQJ@ GLVFUHWLRQ¶ %XOO   ZKLFK forebear the arguments which 
follow. 
These longstanding concerns generally either criticise discretion as being a source of µpotential 
arbitrariness and therefore injustice¶in the provision of social security (Sainsbury, 2008, 328),  
or focus on how to µGLVWLQJXLV>K@ those needs which can usefully be expressed in the form of a 
XQLYHUVDO HQWLWOHPHQW¶ DJDLQVW WKRVH µEHWWHU SURYLGHG IRU LQ D JHQHUDO GLVFUHWLRQDU\ SRZHU¶
(Wilding, 1976, 56). In other words, research on discretion does more than focus on empirical 
claims about how discretionary decision-making is done, but also why its role can be defensible. 
'HDQ¶V ZRUN RQ WKH µGLFKRWRPRXV QDWXUH¶ RI VRFLDO ULJKWV highlights this tension between 
µSURYLGLQJHQWLWOHPHQW¶RQWKHRQHKDQGDQGWKH requirement WRµVXEMHFWSHRSOHWRGLVFUHWLRQ¶
on the other (Dean, 2015, 46-47). The enduring nature of the questions posted in +/$+DUW¶V
essay on discretion ± thought to be lost, but unearthed and published in 2013 ± are testament 
to this longstanding concern when he asks: under what conditions do we tolerate discretion, 
and why? (Hart, 2013, 652). 
There are multiple overlapping rationales for conferring discretion onto local authorities in the 
administration of the welfare state that FDQ MXVWLI\ µWROHUDWLQJ¶ WKRVH SHUFHLYHG GDQJHUV RI
arbitrariness or inequity in provision. Governments and legislatures tasked with creating 
statutory schemes to administer social security are faced with two interfacing monoliths: the 
YDVWµH[WULQVLFFRPSOH[LW\¶RIWKHZHOIDUHV\VWHP (Harris, 2013, 60-67), and the intricacies of 
household circumstances it must account for. Discretion has long been a valuable tool for 
policymakers to manage this complexity, providing the opportunity to enhance the 
µUHVSRQVLYHQHVVDQGDGDSWDELOLW\¶ (Young, 1981, 33) of intricate welfare bureaucracies. The 
motivations and justifications for adopting discretionary approaches to the provision of welfare 
support, however, are more than just pragmatism. I argue that there are four distinct rationales 
for adopting discretionary approaches to welfare provision. 
The first three draw on Molander¶V admirably concise outline of what he argues are the 
justifications for the use of discretion in the administration of social entitlement (Molander, 
2016, 10-12). Each warrants an examination with reference to the UK welfare state here, before 
turning to what I argue is the fourth, additional justification which ± for reasons which will 
become clear ± is not explicitly adopted by Governments as the reasoning behind discretionary 
provision, but is nevertheless evidenced in swathes of recent µwelfare reforms¶. 
1.1.Correcting deficiencies in rule-based reasoning 
$OWKRXJKWKHUHLVDVL]HDEOHSKLORVRSKLFDOOLQHDJHWRDUJXPHQWVRYHUUXOHVEHLQJµVKRWWKURXJK
with discretion¶(Black, 1997, 52), the principle here can be put briefly: the application of a 
general rule in legislation or guidance requires discretionary judgement to apply it to a totality 
of cases. $Q DSSOLFDQW¶V RZQ FLUFXPVWDQFHV PD\ QRW EH GHDOW ZLWK explicitly by a rule or 
envisaged at the point of its drafting, yet a discretionary judgment can still exercise a decision. 
)RUH[DPSOHDQDSSOLFDQWIRUKRXVLQJEHQHILWPXVWEHµRFFXS\LQJ[the] GZHOOLQJDVKLVKRPH¶
(Reg. 7 Housing Benefit Regulations 2006/213). There is a detailed statutory scheme and 
*RYHUQPHQWJXLGDQFHWRDVVLVWLQWKHUXOH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ by the authority, yet it is not difficult 
to envisage circumstances ± especially where an applicant has other accommodation overseas 
or complicated personal relationships to be accounted for under Reg.7(1)-(2) ± where aligning 
lived reality with the detailed statutory prescription and its accompanying guidance warrants 
the exercise of discretionary judgement. The devolved administration of the housing benefit 
scheme and its application procedures (Reg. 89), allows for local authorities to account for such 
variations in circumstances when designing their discharge of these statutory criteria (Seddon 
DQG2¶'RQRYDQ, 11-16). 
1.2.Discretion as a necessary to manage complexity 
For the second justification, the argument goes that discretion arises as a necessary 
consequence of complexity (Molander, 2016, 12). As rule-based systems have a bounded 
rationality, in some cases rules and their accompanying guidance cannot create conditions for 
good judgement.  In such instances, discretionary judgements ± even if tied to broad guidelines 
± are the only route for securing the best outcomes. This justification characterises the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFK WR'+3VZKHUH WKHGLIILFXOWLHVRIGHOLQHDWLQJDQH[KDXVWLYHVHWRI
FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQ XQGHUSLQQLQJ OHJLVODWLRQ LV XQGHUVFRUHG LQVWHDG UHO\LQJ µYHU\ KHDYLO\ RQ
discretionary housing payments to ensure that we have a way of dealing with the difficulties 
DQGFKDOOHQJHVIDFHGE\SDUWLFXODUJURXSVDQGIDPLOLHV¶ (HL Deb, 2 July 2013, v746 c1077). 
Put another way, the complexity of the problem faced by the drafters of legislation means pre-
determining exhaustive rules is difficult, ineffective or impossible. Discretion can meet this 
challenge by avoiding delineation altogether. 
1.3. Individualising service provision 
The final justification advanced by Molander is that, in some forms of µKXPDQSURFHVVLQJ¶
discretion is required to individualise service provision (Molander, 2016, 12). In other words, 
discretion is not a corrective to bright line rules, but instead serves its own purpose by allowing 
µIOH[LELOLW\DQGVHQVLWLYLW\¶LQWKHLUapplication (ibid). This justification can be aligned with the 
calls for µLQGLYLGXDOLVHGMXVWLFH¶WKDWGRPLQDWHGHDUO\GHEDWHVRQGLVFUHWLRQLQWKHZHOIDUHVWDWH
(Titmus, 1971, 131). The argument is that even the most rigid schemes of universal provision 
rHTXLUH VRPH µIOH[LEOH LQGLYLGXDOLVHG¶HOHPHQWV WRHQVXUHHIIHFWLYH and just administration; 
there is something intrinsic to welfare provision which makes taking account of individual 
circumstances a key element of securing justice (ibid). 
This thinking is perhaps best illustrated by current arguments over the failure to effectively 
individuate work search/job-related conditions or the imposition of sanctions on those on out-
of-work benefits. A key recommendation of the wide-ranging ESRC Welfare Conditionality 
SURMHFWKDVEHHQPRUHHIIHFWLYHXVHRI WKHµHDVHPHQWV¶DYDLODEOH WRZRUNFRDFKHV WR ensure 
µVHDUFK UHTXLUHPHQWV >DUH@ DSSURSULDWH WR HDFK LQGLYLGXDO¶V SHUVRQDO DQG FKDQJLQJ
FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ (Dwyer, 2018, 12), and Adler has argued that the application of benefit 
VDQFWLRQV LQ VRPH LQVWDQFHV LV WKH µXQUHDVRQDEOH¶ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI GLVFUHWLRQDU\ MXGJement 
(Adler, 2018, 133). The merits RI µSHUVRQDOLVDWLRQ¶ DUH frequently echoed by Governments 
across the world as part oI WKH µPRGHUQLVDWLRQ DJHQGD¶ LQ WKH GHOLYHry of welfare services 
(Birrell and Gray, 2017, 238). 
1.4. The fourth rationale: Blame avoidance 
These three justifications all look to the value of discretion as a tool in the effective 
implementation of social security schema or as something which arises as the inevitable 
consequence of deficiencies in general rules. If these debates over the effective use of 
discretionary decision-making are evergreen, however, VR WRR DUH WKRVH RYHU WKH µDXVWHULW\
DJHQGD¶DQGµZHOIDUHUHIRUP¶ As Blyth argues, waves of austerity have followed crisis-after-
FULVLVVLQFHWKHVDQGLWVµOXVWHUKDV\HWWRIDGH¶ (Blyth, 2013, 98). Those Governments and 
legislatures tasked with attempting to restructure programmes to reduce expenditure on social 
welfare are faced with more than a problem of effective implementation; they face complex 
political conflicts which go far beyond a binary of arguing either IRU WKHµVWDWXVTXR¶RUIRU
µGLVPDQW>OLQJ@VRFLDOSURWHFWLRQV¶ (Pierson, 1998, 554).  Here, discretion can serve a purpose 
beyond simply improving the delivery of social entitlement or mitigating inherent limitations 
of rule-based systems. 
I argue that there is an additional justification for adopting a discretionary approach which is 
not focused on effective administration at all, nor used publicly to defend policy rationales: the 
use of discretion to avoid delineating social entitlements and consequently to avoid blame for 
restructuring social security programmes. In other words, discretion can be used to circumvent 
conflicts over who is affected by a particular welfare reform or is entitled to additional support, 
pushing highly controversial decisions down to local authorities and thus working to avoid 
responsibility for their effects. The buck can be passed downwards, deliberately avoiding both 
the original decision and blame or accountability for the (likely politically challenging) impact 
which follows. 
,ZLOOFRPHWRVRPHVSHFLILFH[DPSOHVRIWKLVZLWKLQWKH8.µZHOIDUHUHIRUP¶DJHQGDVKRUWO\
but ± as this claim is a central argument of this paper ± LW LV ZRUWK XQSDFNLQJ WKLV µEODPH
DYRLGDQFH¶ rationale in more detail $ JRRG VWDUWLQJ SRLQW LV 3URVVHU¶V HDUOLHU ZRUN RQ WKH
µSROLWLFV RI GLVFUHWLRQ¶ IRFXVHG RQ WKH 6XSSOHPHQWDU\ %HQHILWV VFKHPH and the antecedent 
Unemployment Assistance Board. It has aged brilliantly. HLVDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWµEODFN ER[¶
DSSURDFKHVWRWKHDQDO\VLVRIGLVFUHWLRQIRUHVKDGRZPXFKRIWKHGHEDWHWKDW/LSVN\¶VLQIOXHQWLDO
work on street-level bureaucracy would catalyse. The thrust of his position is that discretion 
FDQVHUYHDµSROLWLFDOIXQFWLRQ¶WRµGLVJXLVHFRQIOLFWLQJpurposes behind both legislation and 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶± RUWRSXWLWSLWKLO\FDQµGHOLEHUDWHO\IXGJ>H@¶ conflicts (Prosser, 1981, 150). 
Drawing on the Unemployment Assistance Board of the 1930s in particular, he argues that 
discretion can work WRµGLVJXLVHWKHLVVXHRIEHQHILWUHGXFWLRQV¶E\SRLQWLQJWRWKHµGLVFUHWLRQ
WRLQFUHDVHDOORZDQFHV¶ (ibid, 151-160) by decentralised agencies or local government. 
7KLV LQVLJKW HFKRHV WKH EURDGHU OLWHUDWXUH RQ µEODPH DYRLGDQFH¶ LQ WKH GHVLJQ DQG
implementation of policy, focused chiefly on legislative delegation of discretion to bureaucrats 
(horizontal delegation of discretion) as opposed to centralised delegation to decentralised 
government (vertical delegation of discretion). Two key principles emerge out of this sizeable 
literature that are relevant for our purposes. Policy-makers are more likely to search for blame 
avoidance strategies: (i) where reforms are viewed as particularly hazardous to electoral 
SURVSHFWVRULQRWKHUZRUGVDUHµSROLWLFDOO\FRVWO\FKRLFHV¶ (Weaver, 1986, 385); and/or (ii) 
where agreement in the legislature is politically problematic due to KLJK OHYHOV RI µSROLF\
FRQIOLFW¶ (Huber and Shipan, 2002, 215). 7KHGLIILFXOWLHV LQ WHDVLQJRXWD µVKDUHGUKHWRULFDO
SRVLWLRQ¶ (Hayton and McEnhill, 2014, 102) LQWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKH&RDOLWLRQ¶V:HOIDUH5HIRUP
Act 2012 attests to both having motivated the design of flagship reforms in the UK, such as the 
so-FDOOHGµEHGURRPWD[¶DQGEHQHILWFDS 
Others have tied these arguments down to demonstrate how *RYHUQPHQWV HPSOR\ µEODPH
DYRLGDQFH¶ strategies when reducing social security payments in the name of welfare reform. 
Dwyer has argued that blame is often attributed to the claimants themselves (Dwyer, 2004, 
266), in a similar way to ongoing GHEDWHVRQµUHVSRQVLELOLVDWLRQ¶ LQWKHµZHOIDUHUHIRUP¶ agenda 
(Patrick, 2012, 6-7; Donoghue, 2013, 88). Pierson, on whom Dwyer draws in his analysis, 
suggests that advocates of welfare retrenchment ZLOOWU\WRµORZHUWKHYLVLELOLW\RIUHIRUPV¶to 
avoid blame for any ill-effects which result (Pierson, 1996, 147).  
I argue that the most effective blame avoidance strategy employed by the Government, in terms 
of dealing with both a hazardous set of social security reductions and high levels of policy 
conflict, KDVEHHQ WRXWLOLVH WKH µIXGJLQJ¶ political function of discretion by requiring local 
authorities to mitigate reforms and providing discretionary powers to top-up core benefits.  As 
RSSRVHGWRGLVFUHWLRQEHLQJXVHGWRUHVROYHDµWHFKQLFDOLQDELOLW\WRIUDPHUXOHV¶LWWKHUHIRUH
EHFRPHV MXVWLILHG DV D UHVXOW RI LWV IXQFWLRQ LQ µEOXUULQJ SROLWLFDO LVVXHV DQG GLVJXLVLQJ WKH
QHFHVVLW\RIFKRRVLQJEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWSROLFLHV¶3URVVHU1981, 169). 
 2. 7KHDSSHDORIµEODPHDYRLGDQFH¶The four functions of buck-passing 
%HIRUH RXWOLQLQJ WKH IXQFWLRQV RI µEXFN-SDVVLQJ¶ which this blame avoidance rationale 
passports P\ DUJXPHQW QHHGV TXDOLI\LQJ LQ WZR UHVSHFWV )LUVW , DP PLQGIXO RI 6WURQJ¶V
criticisms of presenting µSODFH as passive, apolitical and submissive to the 'downloading' of 
DXVWHULW\¶6WURQJ To argue that the incorporation of discretionary decision-making at 
the local level serves functions for the national polity is not to make the empirical claims that 
these operate equally across localities and/or are incapable of being resisted. Responses by 
local authorities to budget reductions has a keen geographical edge; both in terms of the extent 
of impact and equality of outcomes (see a symposium dedicated to the issue in Local 
Government Studies: Bailey et al, 2015). Likewise, complex geographies of contestation ± such 
as food banks, highlighted by Strong (2018) as a form of local agency and analysed in 
*DUWKZDLWH¶VVHPLQDOZRUNLQWKHSDJHVRIWKLVMRXUQDO± underscore that the local level 
is not a passive receptacle for the IXQFWLRQVRXWOLQHGEHORZRU WKH³DXVWHULW\ DJHQGD´PRUH
broadly. 
Second, my argument does not go as far as to map these functions onto the neoliberal project. 
3HFN¶VZRUNRQ³DXVWHULW\XUEDQLVP´DOLJQVWKHSURMHFWRIGHOLYHULQJFXWVWRWKHORFDOVWDWHDVa 
FRUHFRPSRQHQWRI³QHROLEHUDODXVWHULW\´eloquently (Peck, 2012, 651). Others have employed 
his work to analyse FXWVWRORFDOJRYHUQPHQWDQGKRZWKH\DOLJQZLWK³WKHregressive logic of 
austerity urbanism´+DVWLQJVHWDO Although the functions I RXWOLQHEHORZ³RII-load 
H[WHUQDOLWLHV´RQWRWKHORFDOOHYHOLQWKHVame way analysed by Peck (2012, 651), the focus is 
more narrowly on the implications of adopting this IRXUWK µEODPH DYRLGDQFH¶ UDWLRQDOH IRU
conferring discretion in social security schema. The argument here does not carry these as 
inevitable consequences or specific motivations of the UK Government in adopting their 
µZHOIDUHUHIRUP¶SURJUDPPH,QVWHDG,JURXSWRJHWKHUHPSLULFDOSRVVLELOLWLHVZLWKZKDWFRXOG
be the implicit reasons for designing policy schema under the fourth rationale. In an effort to 
covHUERWKLQSDUDOOHO,UHIHUWRWKHPDV³IXQFWLRQV´RIEXFN-passing DVRSSRVHGWR³ORJLFV´ or 
³UHVXOWV´HWF 
The first of these functions is anti-juridification. Here, judicial oversight of reform is restricted 
via re-locating the decision at the local level. Academic attention on µMXULGLILFDWLRQ¶has focused 
on the evolving trend in European welfare states towards formalised, individual rights (Aasen 
et al, 2014). In the context of welfare reform, juridification processes have generally been 
analysed in one of two ways; with a focus on the complexity it engenders ± WKHµTXDOLW\DQG
TXDQWLW\¶RIOHJLVODWLRQ+DUULV-248) ± or on enforcement and redress ± the extent of 
the µOHJDOEDVLVRIULJKWVWRZHOIDUH¶ (Dean, 2013, 157). The argument goes that complicated 
patchworks of underpinning legislation or tightly prescribed statutory entitlements engender 
judicial power at the expense of political and administrative institutions (Magnussen and 
Nilssen, 2013, 243). 
Within the UK, conferring discretion to local authorities restricts judicial oversight. Statutorily 
prescribed benefits usually carry a right to appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, where disputes can 
be resolved and decisions set-aside by a judge (see s.12 Social Security Act 1998). Although 
access to legal aid is extremely limited (see s.10 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012), the tribunal route provides an easier and more holistic means of address 
than a reliance on lodging a judicial review challenge ± with all of the limitations and 
difficulties this brings with it (for a detailed overview, see Palmer, 2007, 151-196) ± in the 
administrative courts. 
The decisions of local authorities to make discretionary awards out of a cash budget fall outside 
RIWKHWULEXQDO¶Vjurisdiction and are far harder to challenge. The Government avoids having to 
delineate those entitled to support in underpinning regulations ± thus limiting judicial oversight 
of their content and administration ± and applicants are reliant on general public law and 
Human Rights Act 1998 grounds to challenge the exercise of discretion by local authorities via 
judicial review, a reliance which is all the more acute given the paucity of funding following 
the OHJDO DLG VFKHPH¶V µattack on judicial review¶ challenges (Sommerlad, 2018, 295). 
Challenges to the underpinning regulations focus on the transfer of decision-making power, 
not the impact of the policy (Meers, 2018, 123-125, 133-137), and judicially reviewing each 
misbehaving local authority imposes an impossible burden on both applicants and the welfare 
advice sector. The cumulative effect is that social security schema with an emphasis on 
conferring discretion can be ± somewhat counter intuitively - shielded from judicial oversight 
relative to those based on delineated requirements. 
The second function is residualising fiscal control. This arises as the central government 
devolves responsibility for decisions down to local authorities while simultaneously setting the 
fiscal parameters in which their discretion is exercised. 7KLVµFXW-and-GHYROYH¶DSSURDFKKDV
characterised the policies stemming from the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and Welfare Reform 
and Work $FWZLWKWKHW\LQJRIµORFDOLVP¶DQGµDXVWHULW\¶JDLQLQJ analytical purchase 
HOVHZKHUHDVµVLQNRUVZLPORFDOLVP¶ (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, 21) RUµDXVWHULW\-ORFDOLVP¶ 
(Featherstone et al, 2013, 177). This problem is often framed in the context oI µILVFDO
HTXLYDOHQFH¶: local authorities being expected to fulfil functions otherwise provided by central 
government, without the concomitant financial support to do so (Schwab et al, 2017). 
Here, the conferral of discretion ± EDGJHGZLWKµORFDOLVP¶rhetoric rooted in local authorities 
EHLQJµEHVWSODFHG¶WRPDNHGHFLVLRQV (HC Deb 19 April 2018 c135717W) ± is not an end in 
itself, it is instead merely a means for delivering a different end: austerity. 7KHµIHWLVKLVDWLRQ¶
(Featherstone et al, 2012, 177) of localism in some areas of social security reform is not tied to 
the inherent value of local decision-making, but instead its function in delivering savings to 
central government budgets.  
Retaining this residual fiscal control also allows central Governments to take credit for 
µVDYLQJV¶WRZHOIDUHH[SHQGLWXUHWKDWWKH\PD\FRQVLGHUHOHFWRUDOO\EHQHILFLDOZKLOHDYRLGLQJ
or blurring responsibility for the negative externalities they generate. Although attitudinal data 
on welfare reform programmes in the UK (and elsewhere) is mixed, it is clear that there is 
support for reductions in expenditure on certain classes of claimant among sections of the 
electorate (Humpage, 2015). This function allows central Governments to proclaim that 
savings have been made, without having to delineate clearly where such savings have landed. 
This leads to the third function: externalising responsibility. There is an assumption that 
because the most immediate impacts of reducing social security expenditure are discernible at 
the local level, solutions to them are best served at that level too. This fails to recognise the 
problematic political asymmetry between the two. By reducing central expenditure and pushing 
GHFLVLRQVGRZQZDUGVJRYHUQPHQWVFDQµH[WHUQDOLVH UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ /RZQGHVDQG3UDWFKHWW
2012, 38) for the impacts of spending reductions, while local authorities find themselves in a 
µSROLWLFDOFXO-de-VDF¶*DIILNLQ, 35) unable to change their fundamental basis. Prosser 
illustrates this problem whHQKHUHIHUVWRWKHSRZHURIFHQWUDOO\GHWHUPLQHGUXOHVDVµSROLWLFDO
VKLHOGV¶DORFDODXWKRULW\WDNLQJDQXQSRSXODUGHFLVLRQFDQXVHWhe common riposte, µ,¶GOLNH
WRKHOS\RXEXW,¶PERXQGE\WKLVUXOH¶3URVVHU 1981, 166). Where discretion is conferred, 
this shield slips and leaves the local authority exposed to responsibility for the effects of 
centrally determined policy. 
This function is situated in longstanding debates on territorial governance which distinguish 
between political and administrative devolution and the resulting asymmetry between 
institutions (Loughlin, 2007, 393-395). Here, administrative responsibility ± delivering central 
government cuts ± is framed as the devolution of political power ± DµORFDOLVHG¶DSSURDFKWR
welfare reform. Local authorities cannot themselves change the content of the underpinning 
regulations and the political composition of councillors may fundamentally disagree with the 
policies, yet they are ascribed responsibility for their practical implementation and 
consequently at least some of their effects. 
The final function ,DGYDQFHKHUHH[LVWVEHIRUHWKHSROLF\¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQWR ease the passage 
of legislation. The conferral of discretion serves a legislative purpose, allowing deficiencies in 
regulations to be placated by referring to overarching discretionary mitigation at the local level. 
Studies of bureaucracy have examined the costs to the µOHJLVODWLYHFDSDFLW\¶RISROLWLFLDQVin 
parliamentary models adopting statutes which confer low-levels of discretion to bureaucrats 
(see Huber and Shipan, 2002, 97-103), arguing that detailed, prescriptive instruments are more 
difficult to pass than those which transfer discretion to other actors. There is a small but 
longstanding literature which analyses how legislators can delegate discretion to maximise 
their own benefit from regulation (particularly in terms of electoral prospects) DQGµGLOXWH¶WKH
costs that their constituents attribute to legislative action (see McCubbins, 1985, 723). Here, it 
is the DELOLW\ WR GLVJXLVH WKRVH FRVWV SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WKH KLJKO\ FRQWHVWHG ILHOG RI µZHOIDUH
UHIRUP¶ZKLFK assists in passing legislation that may otherwise prove too contentious. 
This function applies to the passage of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform 
and Work Act 2016. The specific policy examples this paper turns to ± particularly the DHP 
scheme to mitigate housing benefit reductions ± were returned to frequently in the passing of 
the legislation. That classes of claimant who were not exempted from reductions in the 
regulations could consequently be serviced through discretionary funds at the local authority 
has been a recurrent reflex of Government ministers, leading Baroness Lister to remark with 
regards to the Local Welfare Assistance Scheme, µAh, my Lords, the Pontius Pilate UHVSRQVH¶ 
(HL Deb, 11 December 2017, v787, c1370). 
3. Three English examples 
,QWKH8.WKHµZHOIDUHUHIRUP¶DJHQGDIURPWKH&RDOLWLRQ*RYHUQPHQWRQZDUGVH[KLELWV
an odd Janus-face: an emphasis on µVLPSOLILFDWLRQFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ¶ LQ some reforms, notably 
8QLYHUVDO &UHGLW DQG FOHDU µJURZLQJ FRPSOH[LW\ORFDOLVDWLRQ¶ IRU RWKHUV (McKay and 
Rowlingson, 2016, 190). Although the focus here is on three key examples of the latter, it is 
important to acknowledge that the dynamics of these reforms are complex and far from clearly 
delineated, particularly those stemming from the Welfare Reform Act 2012 formulated in the 
Coalition years (Hayton and McEnhill, 2014, 102).  
In addition to the complexities of the motivations behind the 2012 Act, these three reforms all 
sit within a far broader programme of heavy reductions to local authority grants. Local 
authorities in England have faced fiscal decimation since the 2008 financial crisis, though the 
extent of impact KDVDNHHQJHRJUDSKLFHGJH*UD\DQG%DUIRUG¶VZRUNSURYLGHVDQDVVHVVPHQW
of the impact a decade on, suggesting that real-terms cuts to service provision between 2009/10 
to 2016/17 have varied between authorities from 46% to 1.6% (Gray and Barford, 2018, 551). 
These discretionary pots below all sit within this demanding and variant local government 
fiscal environment. 
With this context in mind, the three schemes dealt with below ± the abolition of council tax 
benefit, the DHP scheme, and the replacement of the discretionary Social Fund with Local 
Welfare Assistance Schemes ± all exhibit the blame avoidance functions of conferring 
discretion detailed above. Each will be dealt with in turn. 
3.1.Localising council tax support 
The abolition of council tax benefit and its replacement with the local authority administered 
and designed CTRS is an exercise in the externalisation of responsibility par excellence. Under 
s.33(1)(e) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, the Government laid regulations to abolish council 
tax benefit, with provision for the new scheme made in ss.9-16 Local Government Finance Act 
2012. As opposed to the pre-existing centrally funded scheme with tightly delineated eligibility 
requirements, the new CTRS is designed at the discretion of local authorities under some 
prescribed requirements, chiefly securing provision for pensioners, set out in the Council Tax 
Reduction Schemes (Prescribed Requirements) (England) Regulations 2012 (SI 2885). This 
conferral of discretion is ± perhaps unsurprisingly ± accompanied by a reduction in funding 
relative to the previous scheme. English local authorities received 10% less than the forecast 
expenditure for 2013/14, and this baseline has since been subsumed into the new business rates 
retention system, with no direct allocation of funds from central Government provision of the 
CTRS.i 
7KH*RYHUQPHQW¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKHGHYROXWLRQRIVXSSRUWLQFOXGHs giving local authorities 
µDJUHDWHUVWDNHLQWKHHFRQRPLFIXWXUHRIWKHLUORFDODUHD¶DQGreinforcing WKHµGULYHIRUJUHDWHU
local financial accountability and decision-PDNLQJ¶ (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2011). In the context of a reduction in funding of £420 million per annum, 
Government ministers emphasised in the course of debates on the underpinning regulations 
WKDW ORFDODXWKRULWLHVFRXOGµWDLORUVFKHPHVWRVXLW ORFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶DQGµFKRRVHWRGUDZ
UHVRXUFHVIURPRWKHUSDUWVRILQFRPHVWUHDPV¶ (HC Deb, 31 January 2012, c774). When faced 
with subsequent questions on the adequacy of funding or the impact of changes to the scheme, 
the government has responded by referring to the broad discretionary power given to local 
authorities, underscoring thDWµWKHVHDUHORFDOVFKHPHVDQGLWLVIRUORFDODXWKRULWLHVWRFRQVLGHU
WKHHIIHFWRQVSHFLILFJURXSVRIFRXQFLOWD[SD\HUV¶ (HL Deb, 18 June 2015, cHL291W). 
The blame avoiding effect of conferring discretion over the design of CTRSs is demonstrated 
aptly by the 6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKH/RQGRQ%RURXJKRI+DULQJH\¶VVFKHPHLQ
R (on the application of Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey [2014] UKSC 56. The facts 
and decision in case exhibit how the creation of the CTRS serves the functions outlined above, 
externalising responsibility for the impacts of abolishing council tax benefit, limiting judicial 
oversight of the central scheme at the expense of local authorities (anti-juridification) while 
allowing the central government to achieve their budget cut (residualising fiscal control). The 
DEROLWLRQRI&RXQFLO7D[%HQHILWSXWVHYHUHVWUDLQRQ+DULQJH\/%&¶VILQDQFHV,IWKH\ZHUHWR
provide relief at the equivalent level as centrally administered before April 2013 ± or would be 
SURYLGHGXQGHUWKHµGHIDXOWVFKHPH¶RXWOLQHGLQWKH&RXQFLO7D[5HGXFWLRQ6FKHPHV'HIDXOW
Scheme) (England) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2886) ± they would face an effective budget 
shortfall of µDERXW±¶EHFDXVHRIDWUHQGWRZDUGVPRUHKRXVHKROGVLQWKHDXWKRULW\¶VDUHD
becoming eligible for council tax relief under the old scheme. Put another way, although the 
10% reduction in the 2013-14 budget is based on the previous \HDU¶VDOORFDWLRQ the real term 
cuts facing Local Authorities in the provision of council tax may in fact be far larger. 
In discharging their duty to consult on the formation of the CTRS scheme under Schedule 1A 
to the Local Government Finance Act 1992 (amended by Paragraph 1 of Schedule 4(1) of the 
Local Government Finance Act 2012), Haringey sent a letter to all 36,000 households who 
were eligible for the predecessor council tax benefit. This began by drawing a clear conduit 
between a reduction in the money provided by central Government and the pending reductions 
in council tax assistance. For a reader familiar with the cuts to council tax provision and the 
funding environment faced by local authorities, it may appear to be an uncontroversial 
statement of the situation: 
At present the Government gives us the money we need to fund council tax benefit in 
Haringey. We will receive much less money for the new scheme and once we factor in 
the increasing number of people claiming benefit and the cost of protecting our 
pensioners, we estimate the shortfall could be as much as £5-7m. 
This means that the introduction of a local council tax reduction scheme in Haringey 
will directly affect the assistance provided to anyone below pensionable age that 
currently involves council tax benefit. (emphasis in the original) (para. 17). 
In a similar vein, an DFFRPSDQ\LQJERRNOHWHQWLWOHGµ7KH*RYHUQPHQWLVDEROLVKLQJ&RXQFLO
7D[%HQHILW¶VWDWHGWKDW 
µ(DUO\ HVWLPDWHV VXJJHVW WKDW WKH FXW ZLOO OHDYH +DULQJH\ ZLWK DQ DFWXDO VKRUWIDOO LQ
funding of around 20%. This means Haringey claimants will lose on average 
DSSUR[LPDWHO\LQHYHU\RIVXSSRUWWKH\FXUUHQWO\UHFHLYHLQ&RXQFLO7D[%HQHILW¶
(para 19). 
From this documentation, it is clear that Haringey LBC dismissed options for absorbing these 
cuts from elsewhere (for instance, by reducing services in other areas or raising the council tax 
levy on households). Instead, it was suggested that the benefit levels be reduced relative to the 
cuts made, effectively passing on the Government reductions and leading to cuts of between 
18% and 22% per annum for remaining recipients after exempting certain populations (such as 
pensioners and those with disabilities unable to work) (para.9). 
The drawing of this causal inference troubled the court. The design of the CTRS scheme in 
+DULQJH\SDVVHGRQWKHEXGJHWFXWIURPFHQWUDO*RYHUQPHQWEXWµWKHUHGXFWLRQLQJRYHUQPHQW
funding did not inevitably have that effect¶ (para. 19). Haringey could have, theoretically at 
least, drawn money from elsewhere in their reduced budgets to service additional council tax 
relief. By drawing a conduit between the cuts to the provision of council tax relief and the 
associated reduction in the CTRS, the local authority had presented the reduction as inevitable 
DQGWKHUHIRUHµGLVJXLVHGWKHFKRice made by Haringey itself¶ (para. 42). 
This is buck-passing in action. By conferring Haringey LBC the discretion to design the CTRS 
and supplement with (non-existent) additional funds, alongside a duty contained in the 
amended 1992 Act to consult on the changes, the decision to reduce expenditure on council tax 
relief is no longer that of central Government: it is Haringey¶V The Government have 
externalised responsibility for the cuts. The Court determined that to present reductions in 
support as a direct result of GoverQPHQW FXWV LV WR µGLVJXLVH¶ WKH DXWKRULW\¶V choice; 
notwithstanding that the reductions are the result of Government policy to significantly reduce 
funding (residual fiscal control). The challenges railing against this policy have been to its 
discharge at the local authority level ± the eligibility requirements for local schemes or the 
exercise of the consultation requirements in particularii ± as opposed to challenges to the root 
legislation, and therefore Government policy, itself (anti-juridification). 
3.2.Discretionary Housing Payments 
DHPs DUHGLVFUHWLRQDU\µWRS-XS¶SD\PHQWVPDGHWRDQ\RQHLQUHFHLSWRIKRXVLQJEHQHILW7KH\ 
now play a central role in the British social security system and form the principal means of 
mitigation for most households affected by reductions to housing benefit stemming from the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 and Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 ± PRVWQRWDEO\WKHµEHQHILW
FDS¶WKHVR-FDOOHGµEHGURRPWD[¶DQGFDSVWR/RFDO+RXVLQJ$OORZDQFHFrom a small-scale 
discretionary fund, accounting for approximately £20 million per annum of expenditure across 
the UK in 2001/2002 (Leicester and Shaw, 2003, p. 5), the same regulations now shoulder over 
£1 billion of expenditure over the course of this Parliament (HC Deb 22 June 2017, vol.626, 
col.230). No longer focused simply on providing temporary, low-level payments in limited 
cases of hardship, DHPs now serve as the only viable mitigating mechanism for many of those 
DIIHFWHGE\WKH&RDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶VIODJVKLSZHOIDUHUHIRUPV Their significance is unlikely 
to fade given the repeated emphasis by the government on their availability and capacity to 
shoulder upcoming reforms (HC Deb 22 June 2017, vol.626, col.230). 
 
The Government retains residual control over their financing in England and Wales, with the 
Department for Work and Pensions allocating an annual budget ± calculated with reference to 
a centralised formula ± to Local Authorities across the United Kingdomiii to provide DHPs to 
those in receipt of housing benefit who require additional assistance to meet their housing costs. 
The most recent annual allocation ± 2018/19 ± totalled £153 million, notionally split between 
mitigating LHA rHIRUPVPLOOLRQWKHµEHGURRPWD[¶PLOOLRQWKHEHQHILWFDS
PLOOLRQDQGµEDVHOLQHIXQGLQJ¶ (£18 million) ± the amount effectively rolled over from before 
the Welfare Reform Act 2012 suite of reforms (House of Commons Library, 2018, 5). Local 
authorities are not, however, required to ring-fence specific expenditure to any of these areas. 
Instead, the underpinning Discretionary Financial Assistance Regulations 2001/1167 provide 
a broad discretion to local authorities in making awards, with three key limitations: (i) 
pD\PHQWV FDQ RQO\ EH PDGH WR WKRVH UHFHLYLQJ +RXVLQJ %HQHILW RU WKH µUHOHYDQW DZDUG RI
XQLYHUVDOFUHGLW¶RVWHQVLEO\WKHµKRXVLQJHOHPHQW¶Reg. 2(1)(a)), (ii) the local authority must 
EH VDWLVILHG WKDW WKH FODLPDQW UHTXLUHV µVRme further financial assistance in addition to the 
EHQHILWWRZKLFKWKH\DUHHQWLWOHGWRPHHWWKHLUKRXVLQJFRVWV¶5HJEDQGLLLSD\PHQWV
cannot cover certain exempted areas, such as benefit sanctions, increases in rent due to arrears 
or service charges (Reg. 3). 
7KHDGRSWLRQRIWKLVµ'+3VWUDWHJ\¶ZDVVROGDVSDUWRIWKH&RDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶VHIIRUWWR
DYRLG µVWDQGLQJ EDFN DQG LPSRVLQJ VRPHWKLQJ¶ RQ ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV :RUN DQG 3HQVLRQV
Committee, 2014). Ministers have been at pains to emphasise that the payments are 
discretionary ± repeatedly returning to the response that µWKHFOXHLVLQWKHWLWOH¶ (HC Deb, 26 
March 2013, c473WH, HC Deb 25 Nov 2013, v571, c13) ±  repeatedly expressing an eagerness 
for local authorities to decide when to make DZDUGVZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRµORFDOLVVXHV¶ (HC Deb 
25 2013, v559, c976W). 7KH'HSDUWPHQWIRU:RUNDQG3HQVLRQV¶JXLGDQFHXQGHUVFRUHVWKDW
the payments are µILUVW DQG IRUHPRVW  DGLVFUHWLRQDU\VFKHPH¶ (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2018), with the only prescriptive requirements echoing demands made by statute or 
case law, such as limits to the level of DHP awards being set at the level of eligible rent, or 
VXJJHVWLQJWKDWORFDODXWKRULWLHVVKRXOGµFRQVLGHU¶PDNLQJSD\PHQWVLQFHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHV, 
such as when children are unable to share a bedroom due to disability, but fall outside of the 
statutory exemption by virtue of not receiving the middle or higher rate  disability benefits 
(ibid). ,QGHHG WKH µHQWLUHO\ GLVFUHWLRQDU\¶ QDWXUH RI WKH VFKHPH and the ability of local 
authorities to set their own priorities for whom to pay, is expressly raised as a concern by the 
Social Security Advisory Committee (2013).  
 
The emphasis on local authority discretion situates the availability of these payments as a 
veritable panacea within the UK social security system. Anyone faced with a shortfall in 
housing benefit for whatever reason should apply to their local authority for support: if it is not 
forthcoming, that is the exercise of local discretion, not the inevitable result of government 
policy. Their availability provides an easy rote response for Government ministers faced with 
criticisms of high profile housing benefit reforms in Parliament, easing passage of 
underpinning legislation. This is perhaps best illustrated in parliamentary debates on the impact 
RIWKHµEHGURRPWD[¶. The availability of DHPs has been invoked by government ministers as 
a catch-all for all circumstances not dealt with in the regulations. To give but a few examples 
of many, the availability of the payments has been used to justify the impact of measures on 
victims of domestic violence (HC Deb, 21 November 2016, Cw), lone-parent households (HC 
Deb, 14 November 2016, Cw), care leavers (HL Deb, 18 October 2016, v774, c23WS), families 
with severely disabled children (HC Deb, 4 May 2016, Cw), people with disabilities, jobseekers 
and those   on low incomes (HC Deb 22 June 2017, v626, c230). More recently, their 
availability has even been used to placate concerns in Parliament that victims of the Grenfell 
fire may be affecWHGE\ WKHµEHGURRPWD[¶RUµEHQHILWFDS¶ upon relocation (HL Deb 5 July 
2017, vol.783, col.885). In all circumstances the argument is the same: a statutory exemption 
is not necessary as local discretion exists to award a DHP. 
 
Often, there is an unclear dividing line between WDONRIµH[HPSWLRQV¶ and the availability of 
DHPs; the opportunity of applying for the latter being construed as the former. The most high-
profile example is that of the then Prime Minister David &DPHURQ¶V UHVSRQVH LQ 3ULPH
0LQLVWHU¶V4XHVWLRQs to a question about disabled individuals not being exempted from the 
¶EHGURRPWD[¶µWKHULJKWKRQ*HQWOHPDQLVFRPSOHWHO\ZURQJEHFDXVHDQ\RQHZLWKVHYHUHO\
disabled children is exempt from the spare room VXEVLG\¶ (HC Deb, 6 March 2013, c952). 
2WKHU H[DPSOHV DERXQG VXFK WKH 0LQLVWHU RI 6WDWH IRU 3HQVLRQV VWDWLQJ WKDW µDQ DGGLWLRQDO
bedroom will be allowed [for cancer patients] when determining the number of bedrooms they 
QHHG¶ (HC Deb, 22 April 2013, c700W). Importantly, these populations are not automatically 
statutorily exempted, but are instead (in most circumstances) reliant on the DHP process. 
 
Given the pivotal role they play for the hundreds of thousands of households affected by these 
reforms, the sufficiency of the overall DHP budget allocation is a particularly acute issue The 
National Audit Office (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012), Social Security Advisory 
Committee (Social Security Advisory Committee, 2015), and the House of Commons Work 
and Pensions Committee (Work and Pensions Committee, 2014) have all been vocal on the 
EXGJHW¶VDSSDUHQWarbitrariness and insufficiency. The National Audit Office has attempted to 
quantify the extent of the shortfall, suggesting (back in 2011) that total DHP funding amounted 
to only 6% of total Housing Benefit reductions due in the Welfare Reform Act 2012 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2012) ± as stated by the Social Security Advisory 
Committee, WKHµWUDQVIHURIUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHGHOLYHU\RIVHUYLFHVLVQRWDOZD\VPDWFKHGE\
DWUDQVIHURIIXQGVWRIXOILOWKHWDVN¶(Social Security Advisory Committee, 2015). It is perhaps 
surprising, therefore, that not all local authorities spend the entirety of their DHP budgets; 33% 
of authorities spend less than 95% of their DWP allocation (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2018). Though local variations in the implementation of the scheme ± both in terms 
of its administration and attachment of conditionality to awards ± makes drawing conclusions 
from this variation in expenditure particularly challenging (Meers, 2015, 122-126). 
 
The availability of these payments not only works to externalise responsibility while retaining 
residual fiscal control and to ease the passage of legislation, they also serve the anti-juridication 
function too. The Courts have returned frequently to the availability of the payments in judicial 
review challenges to key housing benefit reforms ± SDUWLFXODUO\WKHµEHQHILWFDS¶DQGVR-called 
µEHGURRP WD[¶ 7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ on the latter in R. (on the application of 
Carmichael) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 58 illustrates this well. 
In assessing whether the claimants ± in this case, those with disabilities affected by the 
µEHGURRPWD[¶± KDGEHHQXQODZIXOO\GLVFULPLQDWHGDJDLQVWWKH&RXUW¶VIRFXVZDVLQHYLWDEO\
structural: whether there was a justification for treating alike cases separately under the 
regulations and if the use of the DHP scheme for others was reasonable. The bulk of the 
claimants were unsuccessful as the Court determined that WKHµ6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶Vdecision to 
VWUXFWXUHWKHVFKHPHDVKHGLGZDVUHDVRQDEOH¶SDUD. By conferring discretionary space, 
the question is whether the decision to adopt the discretionary approach can be justified, not 
the impacts on or classes of claimants affected. 
 
3.3.Closure of the Discretionary Social Fund 
The Welfare Reform Act 2012 heralded not only a series of significant benefit reductions and 
abolitions, but also a transfer in responsibility for meeting needs arising from personal crises 
or community care costs from central to local government. The Social Fund, formed in 1988 
in the wake of the Fowler reviews of the social security system, operated in two streams: the 
discretionary social fund (comprised of community care grants (CCGs), and budgeting and 
crisis loans), and the administration of sure start maternity grants, funeral payments and the far 
more widespread winter fuel payments. The former stream concerned itself with either non-
UHSD\DEOH JUDQWV IRU WKRVH XQGHU µH[FHSWLRQDO SUHVVXUH¶, generally to support individuals 
returning to the community from institutional care (CCGs), or re-payable loans to assist with 
µOXPS\¶H[SHQGLWXUHRUWKRVH facing unforeseen emergencies. It is these discretionary awards 
which garnered particular attention in the formation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. 
The centralised administration of the fund ± SURFHVVHGDFURVVWZHQW\µEHQHILWGHOLYHU\FHQWUHV¶
across the UK (Grover, 2012, 355) ± was critiqued by Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
,DLQ'XQFDQ6PLWKDVµFRPSOH[RYHU-centralised, poorly targeted and failing those it is meant 
to help the most¶ (House of Commons Library, 2013). Although the rhetoric was focused on 
SURYLGLQJ µIOH[LELOLW\¶ WR VXSSRUW WKRVH µLQ JUHDWHVW QHHG DFFRUGLQJ WR ORFDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ 
(House of Commons Library, 2013), the key implicit message was that the scheme was costing 
too much (Grover, 2012, 355). 
As a result, CCGs and crisis loans were ended, with budgeting loans rolled into a new nationally 
administered system for benefit on-set support. The cash for the abolished elements was then 
pushed downwards to local authorities ± approximately £200 million per annum across the UK. 
The regulatory context is simple to summarise: this money is not ring-fenced for local welfare 
assistance functions and there are no constraints on how it is spent other than the general bounds 
of public law. 
The Government have argued continually that this is not a cost-saving measure; the money 
spent on the old scheme is simply being re-oriented via local authorities to improve the quality 
of provision. There are two problems with this claim. First, as highlighted by the Centre for 
Responsible Credit, it is reliant on a partial reading of the Social Fund expenditure statistics. 
Compared to low-spending years expenditure is broadly equivalent, but not compared to high-
spending periods. For instance, taking 2010/11 expenditure, the DWP budget for local welfare 
schemes in 2013/14 was 39% lower (Gibbons, 2015, 26), marking a significant reduction in 
total support Second, it is important to note this non-ring-fenced cash is being devolved to local 
authorities at the same time as their budgets are being savaged with average reductions of 37% 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2016). To describe the fiscal environment for local 
authorities as challenging would be to understate the intense challenges they face. Lowndes 
and Gardner¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIORFDOJRYHUQPHQWEHLQJ subject to µVXSHUDXVWHULW\¶ZKHUHFXWV
year-on-year compound previous reductions, underscores the acute financial pressure 
(Lowndes and Gardner, 2016). Any devolution of cash ± especially that not ring-fenced or 
subject to any statutory control ± is likely to find itself subject to multiple competing pressures 
in such a constrained fiscal environment. To describe it as equivalent provision to a centralised 
scheme is to ignore completely these parallel budget cuts. 
Instead of a focus on fiscal savings ± with the problems with that claim detailed above in mind 
± the Government has instead argued that the devolution of the scheme is instead to improve 
the quality of the discretionary decision-making. The familiar tropes of local authorities being 
µEHVWSODFHGWRGHFLGHKRZWRWDUJHWIOH[LEOHKHOS¶ (HC Deb 19 April 2018 c 135717W) and are 
those µZKRXQGHUVWDQGWKHLUFRPPXQLWLHVDQGZKRDUHEHVWSODFHGWRPDNHWKHULJKWFDOO¶ (HL 
Deb, 20 November 2017, cW), are used to justify the transfer of a nationally administered 
scheme to EHFRPHµXOWLPDWHO\ a matter for local discretion¶ (HL Deb, 20 November 2017, cW).  
This approach demonstrates the conferral of discretion at the local authority level as blame 
avoidance in two key ways. First, the devolved cash is tied to an extremely broadly stated 
SXUSRVHRIVXSSRUWLQJµORFDOZHOIDUHQHHGV¶ (HC Deb 19 April 2018 c 135717W). In his letter 
to local authorities outlining the changes and the scope of the allocated budgets, Steve Webb 
03VWDWHGWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQWµH[SHFW>V@WKHIXQGLQJWREHconcentrated on those facing the 
greatest difficultly in managing their income and to enable a more flexible response to 
XQDYRLGDEOHQHHG¶VXPPDULVLQJWKHEURDG-EUXVKGLVFUHWLRQDVIROORZVµLQVKRUWWKHIXQGLQJ
is to allow you to give flexible help to those in genuine need¶ (Webb, 2012). This catch-all 
obligation has even been articulated as being commensurate with the s.2 Local Government 
$FW  SRZHU IRU ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV WR µSUomote well-EHLQJ¶ LQ WKHLU DUHD +/ 'HE 
November 2017, cW). This significant shift externalises responsibility by implying that those 
in need of welfare assistance ± and particularly those who have not received equivalent 
provision following the closure of the Social Fund ± face this as a result of a failure of local 
authority discretionary decision-making, not as a result of central government policy. 
Second, by neglecting to impose either statutory constraints on expenditure or anything in the 
way of reporting obligations, the Government abdicates blame for a lack of financial provision 
to meet local needs ZKLOHUHWDLQLQJDµVDYLQJ¶WRWKHFHQWUDOEXGJHWV. The expenditure reduction 
has been achieved without the accountability for the subsequent lack of provision. The reflex 
of Government ministers to refer to problems with local welfare assistance as due to µlocal 
spending decisions¶ LV ZKDW /LVWHU GHULGHV DV WKH µ3RQWLXV 3LODWH UHVSRQVH¶ (HL Deb, 11 
December 2017, v787, c1370) ± by refusing to track the expenditure of allocated funds, the 
Government can wash their hands of deficiencies in local authority schemes. This response 
persists in the face of compelling evidence that local welfare assistance schemes are under 
acute threat. The Centre for Responsible Credit has found that as of September 2017, 26 local 
authorities had closed their schemes completely, and a further 41 had cut spending by over 
60% relative to the previous year (Gibbons, 2017). 
4. Conclusion 
The fundamental argument of this paper has been that conferring discretion to local authorities 
can serve as a form of blame avoidance. It can externalise responsibility for decisions while 
allowing central government to retain residual financial control, ease the passage of otherwise 
unpalatable legislation and work to limit judicial oversight of central government activity. 
These buck-passing functions are an additional rationale for utilising discretionary decision-
making which has nothing to do with the efficacy of the resulting decisions, but is instead 
focused on avoiding the delineation of those affected by reforms and the responsibility for 
impacts. TRXVH3URVVHU¶VSKUDVLQJLWFDQµGHOLEHUDWHO\IXGJH¶SUREOHPDWLFFRQIOLFWV I will not 
restate the building-blocks of the argument here, but will instead reflect on three key 
implications of the blame avoiding functions of conferring discretion. 
If the arguments advanced above are correct, then moving away from a localised welfare 
approach ± or at least towards a more effective localised welfare approach ± is not dependent 
on convincing the Government that current approaches are ineffective in administering social 
entitlement. That is not the rationale behind the design of the policy schema that underlie them. 
The central Government will be reluctant to reform as it would involve delineating the impact 
of welfare reductions. To underpin support or exemptions for certain classes of claimant via 
legislation is to define who is affected: who will lose their homes because of the benefit cap, 
or freezes to Local Housing Allowance? Criticisms of the deficiency in local provision 
therefore need to be coupled with explicit criticisms of trying to avoid blame for the impacts 
of centrally imposed budget reductions. 
The second issue flows from the first. Many criticisms of these discretionary schemes have 
focused on the unsatisfactory provision of cash, looking at the size and calculation of the 
discretionary pot. Criticisms by the National Audit Office and the Welsh Affairs Committee of 
the localised approached to mitigating reductions to housing benefit echo this approach, 
focusing on the lack of monitoring functions and how centrally allocated cash is calculated 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2012; Welsh Affairs Committee, 2013). Criticisms of the 
size of these pots need to be accompanied with an assessment of the classes of claimants who 
are not receiving awards. This allows for an interrogation of the µIXGJLQJ¶HIIHFWRIFRQIHUULQJ
discretion in the passing of legislation. If groups that have been highlighted in the legislative 
process as being important benefices of this discretionary support (such as victims of domestic 
violence or people with disabilities) are not receiving it, this lends weight to the argument for 
reform in a way that headline spending does not. 
The final point concerns cumulative impact. This paper has dealt with three key reforms, but 
there are others too ± most notably the closure of the Independent Living Fund (see Porter and 
Shakespeare, 2016). These overlapping reforms have a compounding effect. Claimants 
engaging with one scheme are likely to encounter another. This is particularly true of DHPs 
and the CTRS. Deficiencies in one can increase reliance on another scheme, or administrative 
and financial problems in one local authority, as the claimant will be applying to the same for 
all of them, can impact on the availability of support across multiple schemes. 
To acknowledge the µEODPHDYRLGDQFH¶UDWLRQDOHIor conferring discretion is to ensure that the 
four functions of buck-passing can be interrogated and that our own analyses of the welfare 
state do not fall prey to them. An examination of the transfer of discretionary decision-making 
in the design of social security schema should not be limited to a critique of its efficacy in 
delivering social entitlement or implementing policy. Interrogating this blame avoidance 
rationale allows for broader functions that conferring discretion can serve ± particularly in the 
context of making cuts to social entitlement ± for Governments and legislatures. 
 
 
Notes 
 
i
 The position differs for Scotland and Wales, where the devolved governments did not pass 
on the 10% reduction directly to local authorities. 
ii
 Other key cases on the scheme include R. (on the application of Logan) v Havering LBC 
[2015] EWHC 3193 (Admin) and South Tyneside Council v Aitken [2014] EWHC 4163 
(Admin). 
iii
 In Scotland, DHPs are a devolved matter and the mechanics of the scheme are different. Here, 
the Scottish Government provides additional funds to local authorities over and above those 
issued b\WKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶V'HSDUWPHQW for Work and Pensions. 
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